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PETITION FOR APPROVAL 
OF COMPROMISE SETTLEMENT 
The petitioners, The Home Insurance Company and The Hartford 
Insurance Company, respectfully represent unto the Court as fol-
lows: 
(l) This petition is filed pursuant to the provisions of 
Section 8.01-424 of the 1950 Code of Virginia, as amended. 
(2) The petitioners are corporations which have been duly 
certified, licensed and qualified to transact business in the 
Commonwealth of Virginia. 
(3) The respondents Richard Mason Cauthorn, Jr. and Anna 
Cauthorn are the father and mother of the infant respondent. 
(4) The respondent Richard Mason Cauthorn, III, is the 
brother and legal guardian of the infant respondent and has been 
duly qualified and bonded as such by this Court . 
. (5) On or about April 1, 1977, on Route 220 approximately 300 
feet north of Route 649 in Bath County, Virginia, the infant 
respondent, Rebecca Cauthorn, was injured in a two-car accident, 
while riding as a passenger in a 1966 Triumph being operated by 
Ricky June Perry, Route 2, Hot Springs, Virginia. 
(6) The vehicle being operated by Ricky June Perry in which 
!the infant respondent was injured was insured by The Home Insurance 
:company. 
(7) the driver of said vehicle, Ricky June Perry was insured 
by The Hartford Insurance Company. 
(8) The petitioner, The Home Insurance Company provided 
insurance coverage to Mary Ann Graves, owner of the car in which 
the infant respondent was injured, under its policy no. AU5614922. 
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(9) The petitioner, The Hartford Insurance Company provided 
insurance coverage to Ricky June Perry under its policy no. 14GA731-
938. 
(10) As a result of that collision, the infant respondent 
sustained injuries consisting of a fractured skull, a lacerated 
liver, a punctured lung, a broken pelvis, and other bodily injuries 
resulting in a permanent paralysis of the left side, a shortened 
right leg, and permanent brain injury. 
(11) The infant respondent is making a very slow recovery from 
the injuries sustained in the aforesaid accident and still is 
totally dependent upon skilled nursing and professional care. 
(12) Without in any way admitting liability on its part, your 
petitioners have offered to pay the sum of $100,000.00 ($50,000.00 
·each) in compromise of the personal injury claim of the infant 
respondent. This compromise payment would be made in consideration 
of the petitioners receiving a complete release and discharge from 
any and all further liability to the infant respondent for damages 
. 
arising from the aforesaid accident. 
(13) That your petitioners, and respondents Richard Mason 
Cauthorn, Jr., Anna Cauthorn, and Richard Mason Cauthorn, III, 
knowing the uncertainty of all litigation and the expense involved, 
and taking into consideration all facts concerning the accident, 
including the apparent extent of the infant respondent's injuries, 
consider that the compromise settlement of the personal injury 
-- ....... - ..... ._ 
claim of the afore-s.afd-infant. respondent--on·--·the -oasfs-·S--E!"t-- forth 
--------~-- ----~- ·-
above is ±n the best interest of both the infant respondent and 
themselves. 
IN CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, your petitioners pray: 
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(A) That the aforesaid infant Rebecca Cauthorn, and her 
parents, Richard Mason Cauthorn, Jr. and Anna Cauthorn, and her 
,legal guardian, Richard Mason Cauthorn, III, be made parties to 
I 
rthis proceeding, convened before this Court and required to answer 
this petition; 
j (B) That a guardian ad litem be appointed to protect the 
!interests of the aforesaid infant and to advise the Court whether 
I 
lhe oelieves the proposed compromise settlement to be fair and in 
the best interest of said infant; 
(C) That the Court confirm and approve the aforementioned 
compromise settlement and enter an order approving the same under 
the provisions of Section 8.01-424 of the Code of Virginia, as 
amended: 
(D) That the proceeds payable under the aforementioned com-
promise settlement to the infant respondent, Rebecca Cauthorn, be 
1 ordered paid and delivered as follows: $9,615.55 to Richard Mason 
lcauthorn, Jr. and Anna Cauthorn, as reimbursement for medical ex-
1 lpenses, mileage, travelling expenses, meal expenses, telephone 
expenses, expenses for therapy room, automobile expenses, aid to 
Rebecca Cauthorn, household improvements, supplies for Rebecca 
Cauthorn's care, clothing, and hospital bills at Bath County 
Community Hospital, Roanoke Memorial Hospital, and medical bills 
from Dr. Myers. The remainder ($90,384.45) shall be ordered paid 
I 
· and delivered to Richard Mason Cauthorn, III, as Trustee and legal 
guardian for the infant respondent to be held for the benefit of 
; the infant respondent until she reaches majority or until further 
order of this Court; and, 
(E) That this Court enter all such other orders and decrees 
as may be necessary to effectuate the purpose of this petition. 
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Respectfully, 
THE HOME INSURANCE COMPANY 
and 
: \:.:::\~~s~~:~~~ANY 
\ \ Of Counsel ,S 
Woods, Rogers, Muse, Walker & Thornton' 
105 Franklin Road, S. W. rf. /7 . d 
Roanoke , Virginia 240~1ed in the Cl_:rk' s Of fie~. tOO~~ .'l':'l!ay of •• C...l~t.-r...f.,.-., 19,7.{ ~ 
Counsel for petiti~fier=:~ $9{)_,.c.r;. T ... ::.:o: 
Fee 3.0 .. ~<\ Clerk 
Deposit . • • . • • • • • t.'·; · .. · · · )7-~Q; · i. • · · · · · · · · · • 
Total Paid $~\f.l-,__o.. ):-'--;~<'.'·'·~~ .•• J •.. ·o.t(.t~~ ... ~ ......... . o. o. 
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ANSWER OF RICHARD MASON 
CAUTHORN, JR., ANNA 
CAUTHORN AND RICHARD 
MASON CAUTHORN, III, 
LEGAL GUARDIAN OF 
REBECCA CAUTHORN 
For their answer to the petition filed in the above-styled 
cause by The Home Insurance Company and The Hartford Insurance 
Company, the undersigned Richard Mason Cauthorn, Jr. and Anna 
Cauthorn, the father and mother of the infant respondent, and 
Richard Mason Cauthorn, III, legal guardian of the infant respon-
dent, state that they have been fully informed of the nature and 
me~ning of the proceeding herein, and, knowing the uncertainty of 
all litigation, the expen~es involved, and what they believe are 
the facts concerning the accident in question, including the appar-
.. ,_ 
, ent extent of the injuries sustained by the infant respondent, they 
are of the opinion that it would be for the best interest of the 
infant respondent and themselves for the compromise settlement as 
set forth in the petition filed by The Home Insurance Company and 
The Hartford Insurance Company to be approved by this Court. 
In consideration of the foregoing, the undersigned requests 
that the compromise settlement set forth in the aforesaid petition 
be approved by this Court and that the proceeds be distributed as 
provided for in said petition. 
{{&!~ -7/e.--,. ~~ Ch 1 
carMason Cautorn, Jr. " 
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ANSWER AND REPORT OF 
GUARDIAN AD LITEM 
FOR REBECCA CAUTHORN 
The undersigned Jowl\\ C . ·s atlt;L..t!.To,J having been 
appointed guardian ad litem for the infant respondent Rebecca 
Cauthorn, begs to report that in compliance with the direction of 
. the Court, he has investigated the facts and circumstances of the 
I accident set forth in the petition filed in this cause and has 
considered whether or not it is for the best interest of the said 
infant respondent to compromise the matters in controversy between 
hiMself and the petitioner for the sum of $100,000.00. 
On the basis of all the pertinent available information, and 
considering the apparent extent of the injuries suffered by the 
infant respondent, the undersigned is of the opinion that it is 
in the best interest of the infant respondent for the Court to 
approve the proposed compromise settlement of the personal injury 





This day came The Home Insurance Company and The Hartford 
Insurance Company, by counsel, and asked leave to file their peti-
tion in which they seek this Court's approval of the proposed 
compromise settlement involving an accident which occurred on or 
about April 1, 1977, in Bath County, Virginia, which resulted in 
personal injuries to the infant respondent, Rebecca Cauthorn. The 
relief requested by the petition is granted, and the petition is 
hereby filed. 
Thereupon the Court, pursuant to said petition, made the 
aforesaid infant and her parents, Richard Mason Cauthorn, Jr. and 
Anna Cauthorn, and her legal guardian, Richard Mason Cauthorn, III, 
parties respondent to this cause, and appointed ~·H~ <:. 
s\~taLC.TO\~ , a discreet and competent attorney at 
law practicing before the bar of this Court, as guardian ad litem 
for ~he infant respondent and directed said guardian ad litem to 
investigate the facts and circ~tances surrounding said accident 
and to report to the Court whether or not in his opinion it would 
lbe for the best interests of the infant respondent to compromise 
all matters in controversy on the basis set forth in the petition 
filed by The Home Insurance Company and The Hartford Insurance Com-
pany. 
Thereupon, the aforesaid parents of the infant respondent and 
the aforesaid legal guardian of the infant respondent filed an 
answer to the petition herein and requested that the proposed 
compromise settlement be approved as provided for in the petition. 
Thereupon, the aforesaid guardian ad litem filed his answer in 
which he recommended that the proposed compromise settlement set 
forth in the petition be approved. 
The cause was then heard .. _Qn_ the basis of the petition and 
t-aj 
' 
the answers filed herein, and evidence heard 2!! tenus, the Court 
is of the opinion that it is in the best interests of the aforesaid 
infant respondent that the proposed compromise settlement set forth 
:in the petition herein, which involves the payment of $100,000.00 
by the petitioners for the personal injury claim of the infant 
respondent, be approved and ratified as provided by Section 8.01-
424 of the 1950 Code of Virginia, as amended. 
It is therefore ADJUDGED and ORDERED that the proposed com-
promise settlement be, and it hereby is, approved and confirmed. 
WHEREUPON Richard Mason Cauthorn, Jr. and Anna Cauthorn, 
parents of the infant respondent, came and requested the Court to 
allow them reimbursement of $9,615.55 to be allowed for expenses 
advanced for the care of Rebecca Cauthorn, the infant respondent. 
The Court, having heard the evidence on the question, doth ADJUDGE 
and ORDER that a reimbursement of $9,615.55 be allowed for the. 
expenses advanced and services rendered to said infant respondent 
out of the aforesaid compromise settlement of $100,000.00. 
Thereupon the petitioners, in open court, paid Richard Mason 
Cauthorn, Jr. and Anna Cauthorn a reimbursement of $9,615.55 out of 
I 
the aforesaid settlement proceeds, taking a receipt therefor which I 
is filed with the papers herein. 
And it further appearing to the Court that the infant respon-
dent is of insufficient age and discretion to use the remaining sum 
of $90,384.45 judiciously, the Court doth ADJUDGE and ORDER that 
the remaining sum of $90,384.45 be paid to Richard Mason Cauthorn, 
III, Trustee and legal guardian for the infant respondent to be 
held for the benefit of infant respondent until she reaches major-
ity or until further order of this Court. 
Thereupon the petitioners, in open court, paid the aforesaid 
sum of $90,384.45 directly to Richard Mason Cauthorn, III, Trustee 
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and 1egal guardian for the infant respondent, pursuant to the 
Court's order, taking a receipt therefor which is filed with the 
papers herein. 
WHEREFORE, the Court doth further ADJUDGE and ORDER that the 
petitioner The Home Insurance Company under its policy no. 
AU5614922 and the petitioner The Hartford Insurance Company, under 
its policy no. 14GA731-938 be, and they hereby are, forever re-
leased and discharged from any and all further liability under 
. their re~pective policies to the respondents herein for damages 
arising out of the accident which occurred on or about April 1, 
1977. 
And the purposes of this action having been accomplished, the 
· Court doth ORDER that it be stricken from the docket, and the Clerk 
of this Court is directed to furnish forthwith a certified copy of 
this order to any party upon request. 





Receipt of the sum of $9,615.55 paid to us pursuant to the 
Court order set forth above is hereby acknowledged. 
1tf~~hk~~· carMason Cauthorn, Jr. 
Law Order Book 14 
Page 494 
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COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Richard Mason Cauthorn, 
III, a citizen of the Commonwealth of Virginia and Legal Guardian 
of the Estate of Eva Rebecca Cauthorn, an incompetent, by 
counsel, who respectfully moves this Honorable Court for Judgment 
against British Leyland UK Limited and British Leyland Motors, 
Inc., its agent, TPPI Engineering, Inc. and University Motors, 
Ltd., jointly and severally, in the amount of FIVE MILLION 
DOLLARS ($5,000,000.00) in compensatory damages and FIVE MILLION 
DOLLARS ($5,000,000.00) in punitive damages plus interest from 
April 1, 1977 and costs from the Defendants and each of them 
on each of the following counts: 
COUNT I 
1. Prior to April 1, 1977, Defendants British Leyland 
UK Limited and British Leyland Motors, Inc., its agent (herein-
after collectively referred to as "British Leyland"), acting 
py and through its agents, servants and employees, designed, 
manufactured, inspected, tested, distributed and sold a 1976 
TR7 automobile which was subsequently sold new to Mary Graves 
(Shaver) of warm Springs, Virginia. 
2. On or about April 1, 1977, ~he aforesaid 1976 
TR7 automobile which was designed, manufactured, inspected, 
tested, distributed and sold by Defendant British Leyland,equipped 
with spoker wheels designed, manufactured and sold by Defendant 
TPPI Engineering, Inc. and owned by the aforesaid Mary Graves 
(Shaver) was being operated by Ricky June Perry in a generally 
southerly direction on u.s. Route 220 near Hot Springs, Bath 
County, Virginia. 
3. At all times material hereto, Eva Rebecca Cauthorn 
was lawfully a passenger in the aforesaid 1976 TR7 being operated 
in a southerly direction on U.S. Route 220 when suddenly, 
without notice or warning to Ricky June Perry, the operator of 
the aforesaid vehicle, the TR7 in question, began to badly 
vibrate and veered uncontrollably to the right and which, 
after efforts were made to control the vehicle by its operator, 
Ricky June Perry, veered uncontrollably in the direction of 
oncoming traffic as a result of which it was struck by and 
collided with an oncoming vehicle being operated by Larry s. 
Pritt. 
4. The loss of control of the aforesaid automobile 
being operated by Ricky June Perry and the resultant motor 
vehicle collision were caused wholly and solely as a direct and 
proximate result of a defect in and failure of one of the 
spoker wheels on the front of the aforesaid TR 7 automobile 
designed, manufactured, inspected, tested, distributed and 
sold by the Defendant British Leyland. 
5. Wholly and solely as a result of the aforesaid 
accident and the liability producing conduct of Defendant 
British Leyland which will be hereinafter set forth in greater 
detail, the Plaintiff's ward, Eva Rebecca Cauthorn, sustained 
serious and permanent injuries including, but not limited to a 
fractured skull, a cerebral cerebellar and brainstem dysfunction, 
a lacerated liver, a broken pelvis, a punctured lung, and 
numerous other serious injuries as a result of which the Plaintiff's 
ward, Eva Rebecca Cauthorn, is permanently paralyzed, has 
permanent brain damage and has lost the ability to verbally 
communicate. 
6. Wholly and solely as a result of the aforesaid 
accident and the liability producing conduct of the Defendant 
British Leyland which will be hereinafter set forth in greater 
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detail, the Plaintiff's ward, Eva Rebecca Cauthorn, has suffered 
and continues to suffer a full and complete loss of the ability 
to be gainfully employed and suffers a full, complete and 
permanent loss of earnings and/or earning power. 
7. Wholly and solely as a result of the aforesaid 
accident and the liability producing conduct of the Defendant 
British Leyland which will be hereinafter set forth in greater 
detail, the Plaintiff's ward, Eva Rebecca Cauthorn, has suffered 
and continues to suffer severe and excruciating conscious pain 
and suffering, a loss of life's pleasures, gross disfigurement 
and embarrassment. 
8. Wholly and solely as a result of the aforesaid 
accident and the liability producing conduct of the Defendant 
British Leyland which will be hereinafter set forth in greater 
detail, the Plaintiff, on behalf of the Estate of Eva Rebecca 
Cauthorn, an incompetent, has incurred, continues to incur and 
will in the future be required to incur substantial expenses 
for medical, hospital and rehabilitation care and services 
provided to and for Eva Rebecca Cauthorn as a result of the in-
juries sustained by her in the accident in question. 
9. The aforesaid accident and the serious injuries 
.sustained by Eva Rebecca Cauthorn were directly and proximately 
caused by the negligence, carelessness, recklessness and willful 
and wanton misconduct of the Defendant British Leyland, its 
agents, servants, employees and subcontractors in: 
(a) Failing to provide proper design plans and 
specifications to the rnanufa~turer of the spoker wheels on the 
1976 TR7 in question at the time of the accident which is the 
subject of this litigation. 
(b) Failing to properly select a competent 
· .. : 
supplier for spoker wheels for the 1976 TR7 in question. 
(c) Selecting Defendant TPPI Engineering, Inc. 
as the supplier of spoker wheels for the 1976 TR7 in question. 
(d) Failing to insist upon appropriate quality 
control practices and procedures for the 1976 TR7 in question. 
(e) Failing to properly and adequately examine, 
inspect, test, evaluate and quality control the wheels supplied 
for the vehicle in question. 
(f) Failing to properly supervise the manufacture 
of spoker wheels on 1976 TR7 automobiles including the vehicle 
which was involved in the accident in question. 
(g) Suppling with or for the aforesaid 1976 
TR7 defective spoker wheels. 
(h) Failing to take prompt action to notify 
owners of 1976 TR7 automobiles equipped with TPPI spoker wheels 
that said wheels were defective and warn owners that TPPI as 
the manufacturer and supplier of said wheels had fabricated test 
results for said wheels and had failed to report that said wheels 
had failed metal fatigue tests. 
(i) Failing to promptly recall all 1976 TR7 
automobiles equipped with TPPI spoker wheels including the auto-
mobile in question once it was learned by Defendant British 
Leyland that TPPI had experienced a breakdown of quality control 
procedures, had passed wheels which did not successfully withstand 
metal fatigue tests, had delivered spoker wheels to Defendant 
British Leyland which were .defective and had made material mis-
representations concerning their test results of spoker wheels 
designed, manufactured and sold by them. 
(j) Failing to properly warn owners of TR7 auto-
mobiles of the risk of injury due to defects in TPPI spoker wheels. 
(k) Negligence in law and fact; and 
(1) In such other and further particulars as 
may be discovered during the discovery phase of this action. 
COUNT II 
10. The Plaintiff, Richard Mason Cauthorn, III, Legal 
Guardian of the Estate of Eva Rebecca Cauthorn, repeats and 
incorporates the allegations set forth in paragraphs one (1) 
through nine (9) inclusive of Count One of this Motion as if 
each.were fully and completely set forth at length herein. 
11. The aforesaid accident and serious injuries 
sustained by Eva Rebecca Cauthorn were also directly and proxi-
mately caused by the breaches of warranties, expressed and im-
plied, by the Defendant British Leyland. 
12. In marketing and distributing the aforesaid 1976 
TR7 automobile and the spoker wheels in use at the time of the 
accident in question, Defendant British Leyland issued expressed 
and implied warranties to its purchasers and users of its auto-
mobiles and spoker wheels including the 1976 TR7 in question 
and the spoker wheels on it that said automobiles and spoker 
·wheels were of merchantable quality and were fit for the purpose 
for which they were sold. 
13. In marketing and distributing the 1976 TR7 in 
question and the spoker wheels manufactured by TPPI which were 
on the vehicle in question at the time of the accident which 
is the subject of this litigation, Defendant British Leyland 
breached the foregoing war~anties of merchantability and fitness 
for use as a result of which the Plaintiff herein and his ward 
were seriously damaged as set forth in greater detail above. 
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14. Plaintiff herein, through counsel, gave Defendant 
British Leyland prompt notice of the aforesaid loss and breach 
of duty by the Defendant herein together with a demand for re-
imbursement for all losses sustained by the Plaintiff herein. 
15. Depsite receiving prompt and complete notice 
of the Plaintiff's claim, the Defendant British Leyland has 
failed to make payment to the Plaintiff herein for the injuries 
and damages sustained as a result of the breach by Defendant 
British Leyland of the warranties of merchantability and fitness 
for use which accompanied the vehicle and wheels in question. 
COUNT III 
16. The Plaintiff, Richard Mason Cauthorn III, Legal 
Guardian of the Estate of Eva Rebecca Cauthorn, repeats and 
incorporates the allegations set forth in paragrpahs one (1) 
through nine (9) inclusive of Count One of this Motion as if 
each were fully and completely set forth at length herein. 
17. The aforesaid accident and the serious injuries 
sustained by Eva Rebecca Cauthorn were also directly and proxi-
mately caused by the negligence, carelessness, recklessness 
and willful and wanton conduct of the Defendant TPPI Engineering, 
Inc., its agents, servants, emplqyees and subcontractors in: 
(a) Failing to properly design, manufacture, 
test and evaluate spoker wheels which is sold and distributed 
to Defendant British Leyland for British Leyland 1976 TR7 
automobiles including spoker wheels sold to and used by the 
aforesaid Mary Graves (Shaver) on the 1976 TR7 being operated 
by Ricky June Perry at the time of the accident in question; 
(b) Failing to engage in appropriate quality 
control practices and procedures for spoker wheels designed, 
manufactured, sold and distributed by TPPI for the 1976 TR7 
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automobile in question; 
(c) Failing to properly and adequately examine, 
inspect, test, evaluate and quality control spoker wheels sup-
plied to Mary Graves_ (Shaver) for use on the 1976 TR7 motor 
vehicle in question; 
(d) Falsely, fraudulently, and recklessly re-
presenting to Defendant British Leyland that spoker wheels for 
1976 TR7 motor vehicles including the motor vehicle owned by 
Mary Graves (Shaver) were properly designed, manufactured, 
tested and inspected by said TPPI Engineering, Inc.; 
(e) Failing to advise and warn British Leyland 
and the ultimate customers for spoker wheels designed,. manu-
factured and sold by TPPI Engineering, Inc. that spoker wheels 
designed, manufactured and sold by TPPI Engineering, Inc. had 
failed metal fatigue tests; 
(f) Providing false certifications for tests 
purportedly run on spoker wheels designed, manufactured and 
sold by TPPI indicating that said spoker wheels were inspected, 
tested and evaluated in accordance with British Leyland's 
standards and that said wheels passed the necessary tests; 
(g) Failing to cease production once it was 
determined that its spoker wheels failed to meet the design, 
manufacture and testing specifications of Defendant British 
Leyland, Inc.; 
(h) using inferior steel during the manufacturing 
process for the aforesaid spoker wheels; 
(i) Stamping out the steel for the spoker 
wheels rather than flame cutting these spoker wheels; 
(j) Willfully, wantonly and fraudulently with-
holding information concerr.ing defects in spoker wheels designed, 
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manufactured and sold by TPPI and knowingly placing said defective 
spoker wheels into the stream of commerce all of which were to 
the great detriment of the consuming public including Eva 
Rebecca Cauthorn; 
(k) Failing to promptly recall all spoker 
wheels, designed, manufactured and sold by said TPPI once it 
was learned that they were defective and did not comply with 
British Leyland's specifications; 
(1) Negligence in law and facts; and 
(m) In such other and further particulars as 
may be discovered during the discovery phase of this litigation. 
COUNT IV 
18. The Plaintiff, Richard Mason Cauthorn, III, 
Legal Guardian of the Estate of Eva Rebecca Cauthorn, repeats 
and incorporates by references the allegations set forth in 
paragraphs one {1) through nine (9) inclusive of Count I of 
this Motion as if each were fully and completely set forth at 
length herein. 
19. The aforesaid accident and serious injuries 
sustained by Eva Rebecca Cauthorn were also directly and proximat~ly 
caused by the breaches of warranties, expressed and implied, 
by the Defendant TPPI Engineering, Inc. 
20. In marketing and distributing the aforesaid 
spoker wheels in use at the time of the accident in question, 
TPPI Engineering, Inc. issued expressed and implied warranties 
to its purchasers and the users of its spoker wheels including 
the spoker wheels on the 1976 TR7 in use at the time of the 
accident in question that said spoker wheels were of merchantable 
quality and were fit for the purpose for which they were sold. 
21. In marketing and distibuting said spoker wheels 
~8 
which were on the vehicle in question at the time of the accident 
which is the subject of this litigation, Defendant TPPI breached 
the foregoing warranties of merchantability and fitness for 
use,and as a result thereof Eva Rebecca Cauthorn was seriously 
injured as set forth in greater detail above. 
22. Plaintiff herein, through counsel, gave Defendant 
British Leyland prompt notice of the aforesaid loss and breach 
of duty herein together with a demand for reimbursement for 
all losses sustained by the Plaintiff. 
23. Despite receiving prompt and complete notice of 
the Plaintiff's Complaint, neither Defendant British Leyland 
nor TPPI Engineering, Inc. has made payment to the Plaintiff 
herein for the injuries and damages sustained as a result of 
the breach by Defendant TPPI of the warranties of merchantability 
and fitness for use which accompanied the spoker wheels in 
i question. 
COUNT V 
24. The Plaintiff Richard Mason Cauthorn, III, 
Legal Guardian of the Estate of Eva Rebecca Cauthorn, repeats 
· and incorporates the allegations set forth in paragraphs one 
(1) through nine (9) inclusive of Count I of this Motion as if 
each were fully and completely set forth at length herein. 
25. The aforesaid accident and the serious injuries 
sustained by Eva Rebecca Cauthorn were also directly and proximately 
caused by the negligence, carelessness, recklessness and willful 
and wanton misconduct of the Defendant University Motors, 
Ltd., its agents, servants_, employees and subcontractors in: 
(a) Failing to properly and completely inspect 
and examine the 1976 TR7 and the spoker wheels in question 
prior to the time that said 1976 TR7 and spoker wheels were 
1.9 
sold to and delivered to Mary Graves (Shaver); 
(b) Supplying with or for the aforesaid 1976 
TR7 in question a set of defective spoker wheels; 
(c) Having actual notice of the crack in one of 
spoker wheels on the aforesaid vehicle owned by Mary Graves 
(Shaver) and failing to take the necessary steps to warn the 
aforesaid Mary Graves (Shaver) or the users of said vehicle of 
the dangers attendant with the use of an automobile equipped 
with spoker wheels which were designed, manufactured and sold 
by TPPI Engineering, Inc., one of which was actually known by 
Defendant University Motors, Ltd., its agents, servants and 
employees to be cracked; 
(d) Failing to properly inspect, test, maintain, 
repair and replace defective parts including the cracked spoker 
wheel on the aforesaid 1976 TR7 automobile owned by Mary Graves 
(Shaver); 
(e) Failing to take prompt action to notify 
owners of 1976 TR7 automobiles sold by Defendant University 
Motors, Ltd. and equipped with TPPI spoker wheels including 
Mary Graves (Shaver) that said wheels were defective and that 
they should be promptly replaced; 
(f) Failing to warn Mary Graves (Shaver) and 
other owners of 1976 TR7 automobiles equipped with TPPI spoker 
wheels of the danger of operating said automobiles with cracked 
spoker wheels; 
(g) Failing to properly warn Mary Graves (Shaver) 
and other owners of TR7 automobiles of the risk injury due to 
defects in and cracked spoker wheels as well as spoker wheels 
designed, manufactured and sold by Defendant TPPI; 
(h) Negligence in law and fact; and 
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(i) In such other and further particulars as 
may be discovered during the discovery phase of this litigation. 
COUNT VI 
26. The Plaintiff, Richard Mason Cauthorn, III, 
Legal Guardian of the Estate of Eva Rebecca Cauthorn, repeats 
and incorporates the allegations set forth in the paragraphs 
one (1) through nine (9) inclusive of Count I of this Motion as 
if each were fully and completely set forth at length herein. 
27. The aforesaid accident and serious injuries sus-
tained by Eva Rebecca Cauthorn were also directly and proximately 
caused by the breaches of warranties, expressed or implied, by 
the Defendant University Motors, Ltd. 
28. In marketing and distributing the aforesaid 1976 
TR7 automobile and the spoker wheels in use at the time of the 
' accident in question, Defendant University Motors, Ltd. issued 
! " 
expressed and implied warranties to its purchasers and the 
users of its automobiles and spoker wheels including the 1976 
· TR7 in question and the spoker wheels which were on it at the 
time of the accident in question that said automobiles and 
spoker wheels were of merchantable quality and were fit for the 
purpose for which they were sold. 
29. In marketing and distributing the 1976 TR7 in 
question and the spoker wheels manufactured by TPPI which were 
on the vehicle in question at the time of the accident which is 
the subject of this litigation, Defendant University Motors, 
Ltd., breached the foregoing warranty of merchantability and 
fitness for use as a result of which the Plaintiff herein and 
his ward were seriously damaged as set forth in greater detail 
above. 
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result of the breach by Dei~ ~dants of the foregoing warranties 
of merchantability and fitness for use which accompanied the 
vehicle and wheels in question. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Richard Mason Cauthorn, III, 
Legal Guardian of the Estate of Eva Rebecca Cauthorn, an incompe-
tent, respectfully prays for judgment against the Defendants 
and each of them, jointly and severally liable in the sum of 
FIVE MILLION DOLLARS ($5,000,000.00) in compensatory damages 
and FIVE MILLION DOLLARS ($5,000,000.00} in punitive damages 
together with interest thereon from April 1, 1977, the costs of 
prosecuting this action and such other and further relief as 
the Court may deem just and proper. 
COLLINS & SINGLETON 
By __ ~~~~~~~~~~~~--~---­
J c. Singleton,E 
A rney for Plaint 
Of Counsel: 
Christopher C. Fallon, Jr., Esquire 
Cozen, Begier & O'Connor 
The Atrium-Third Floor 
1900 Market Street 
Philadelphia, PA 19103 
<flv .-, I (. ,.. 
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'PLEA IN BAR 
COMES NOW the defendant British Leyland UK, Ltd., now 
known as BL Cars, L~d., and states the following Plea in Bar. 
1. Plaintiff herein alleges that she was injured on or 
about April 1, 1977 while riding in a Triumph TR7 vehicle 
owned by Mary Anne Graves and operated by Ricky June Perry. 
In April of 1978 plaintiff through her guardian compromised 
and settled all claims she may have had against Ricky June 
Perry and his insurance carrier, Hartford Insurance Comt;>any, 
and against Mary Anne Graves and her insurance carrier, Home 
Insurance Company. By Order of this Court entered on April 
27, 1978, these parties were released from any damages arising 
out of the accident which occurred on or about April 1, 1977. 
2. Under Virginia law the release of one joint tortfeasor 
operates as a release of all joint tortfeasors. Bland v. 
Warwickshire Corp., 160 Va. 131 (1933). The releases of the 
ins~rance carriers for the owner and the operator of·the 
vehicle constitute a release of joint tortfeasors and therefore 




Comaa DAW tha c:o-cs.feadaat, Uzdwr•ity !1ot.ora, Ltd., 
oy c:ounael, an4 atatea the following Special Plea in nar. 
1. Plaintiff herein alleqaa tha~ she waa injured 
em or aDout Apri.l 1, ~77 whi~• rid.inq in a 1'riwapil '1'&7 vehicle 
owned by Mazy Ann GJ:'avaa aDd operate<l Dy Ricky June Perry. In 
April of 1.978 plaintiff t:aouqh her guardian compromised and 
aet1:lod All claims aile m&y haw naa aqd.n•t Ricky Juca Purry 
and. hia inaUAACe caxrier, liaztfoJ:cl Insurance company, and 
a9ainat ;iaJ:y AAA cravea and hex inaurance c:arzoier, liome 
Insurance Company. By Ord.al: of ~· Couxt entered on April 17, 
l97a, tbeae partie• were raleaaed from any damaqes ariaing out 
of t:he acciden~ wbioh occurred OD or about April l, 19 77. 
2. Under Vi:ginia law the release of one joint 
ltortfe4aor oporataa aa a role&ae of all'joint tortfoasors. 
oland v. Warvickabira Cory., 160 va. 131 (1~33). The reloaaas 
of the inaw:anca curiera for t.he owner and t.ne opera·tor of tne 
~icle constitute a ~l•aae ol joint tortfeasora and theraforo 





OF T.P.P.I. ENGINEERING, IrJC. 
PLEA IN BAR 
Corm~ s now the d ~fend ant , T • P • P • I • Engineer in y 1 T n c • 1 and sets 1 
forth the followiny plea in bar: 
no basis exists in this cas~ upon which personal jurisdictiun 
co n be est a b 1 i she< 1 o v •.n:· the defendant , '1' • P • P • i . En I::J i nee r i n (j 1 I n c • 
PLEA IN BAR 
Comes now th~ d~~f~rH.l«nt, T.P.P.I. Engin~eciny, Inc., ~nd sets 
r: .=i -.1 t ! 1 or n oc c u r ring on or about 1\p r i 1 1 , 1 9 7 7 , w hi 1 e she w ;:1 s 
ri,Jiw.J in a 1976 TR7 automobile owned by Hary Grav(:S (Sh~ve~r} 
and bt!in~ driven by Ricky June Perry. 
( 2) On April 27, 1978, 'I'he llotne lncur<lnl:e Company, the 
insllr{\nce carriez~ for Hary Graves (Shaver), and The li::lrtford 
Insurance Company, insurance carrier for Ricky June Perry, peti-
tioned the Circuit Court for Bath County for approval of a 
coutprom.i.se settlement invulvin~ an acciuent which occurrec.l on or 
about 1\pril 1, 1977, in U.:tth County, Virvinia, which re~ultec.l in 
personal injuries to the infant Rebecca Cauthorn, and which 
involved the paym~nt of $100,000.00 by the petitioners for the 
personal injury claim of Rebecca Cauthorn. 
(J) On April 27, 1978, upon payment of $100,000.00 by the 
petitioners, the Court orderec.l that The Home Insurance Company 
uadt~r i.t~:; pulic:y of insurance issueu to Hary Graves (Shaver) and 
rl'he Hartford Insurance Company, under its policy of i11su·canc•3 
issued to Ricky June Perry, be forev~r releasetl a:1d discharged 
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from any anu all further liability unuer their respective poli-
.. 
cies . . ~ for damayes ar1.s~ng\ out of the acci,lent which occurred on or 
about April 1, 1977. 
(4) On or about April 1, 1977, Virginia law provided that 
the release of one joi11t tortfeasor operated as th~ release of 
all ""joint tortfeasors. Therefore, this action is barred ·by the 
above-stated releases. 
P L 1.!:1\ 0 F 'l'li E S'r A'rU'l,E 0 F LIM I'L'A'r .L ONS 
Comes now the defendant, T.P.P.I. Engineering, Inc., and 
states that this action is barred by the npplicable statute of 
li.mitations. 
DEHURRER 
Comes now the defendant, T.P.P.I. En{jiueering", Inc., and 
states that the allegations contained in para<:Jraphs 17 ( ·~} and 
17(k) of the l1otion for ,JUtl'jment filed herein are not sufficient 
as a matter of law. 
Parayraph 17(y) alleges a cause of actior1 for failure to 
cease production of the spoker wheel once it was aetermined that 
the wheel failed to meet the design, manufacture and testiny spe-
cifications of defen~ant British Leyland, Inc. No such duty to 
cease production exists at Virginia law. 
Para~raph l7(k) alletjes a cause of action for failure of the 
cl~fenclants to recall all alleycclly def,~ctivf~ wheels. No su<.;h 
duty to recall exists at Vir~inia law. 
GROUNDS OF DEFENS~ 
Comes now the defendant T.P.P.I. EngineerirHJ, Inc., by coun-
26 
sel, and states the followiny grounds of defense to the motion fo~ 
judgment filed herein: 
(1) Defendant, T.P.P.I. Engineering, Inc., is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the 
truth of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of 
the tnotion for judgment. 
2? 
Memorandum Contra Pleas In Bar Based Upon Lack of Personal 
Jurisdiction and Payments By The Home Insurance Company and 
Hartford~ance Company 
insurance carriers or their counsel w~o. were involved in the pre-
paration of the settlement documents knew that the vehicle in 
which Rebecca Cauthorn was riding as a passenger had a cracked 
wheel and/or that the foregoing cracked wheel caused or contributed 
to the accident in question. There is ample support for setting 
aside releases where there is a mutual mistake of fact between 
the parties to the release. Among the Virginia cas~s on this 
issue are J & D Masonry, Inc. vs. Kornegay, an October 15, 1982 
slip ~pinion, a copy of which is attached hereto and Nationwide Mutual 
vs. Muncy, 217 va. 916 (1977). 
At this point, plaintiff lacks information upon which 
to argue and does not argue that the insurance carriers who were 
the petitioners in 1978 knew or should have known that the accident 
in question was caused as a result of a defect in a TPPI wheel 
on the Cauthorn vehicle. Plaintiff does submit, however, that 
at no time during the negotiations which occurred prior to the 
execution of the 1978 settlement documents was there any dis-
cussion concerning a defect in the wheels on the TR-7 in que~tion 
and thus the settlement agreement, if indeed this court construes 
it to be a release of a tort feasor, must be set aside due to mutual 
mistake. Not only was there no realization, indication, contempla-
tion or intention in 1978 that the settlement with the Home and 
Hartford Insurance Companies would be dispositive of all claims 
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which might otherwise arise out of Ms. Cauthorn's serious personal 
injuries, but there was no indication at any time prior to the 
execution of said documents that the plaintiff's accident and 
serious injuries were, in any way, caused or contributed to by 
any defect in the• automobile. 
Finally, plaintiff respectfully submits that a release 
of one tort feasor would no~ bar the plaintiff's claim for breach 
of warranty against the.manufacturet who warranted that its 
• 0 
products were of merchantable quality and fit for the purpose for 
which they were sold. While plaintiff could find no cases 
precisely on point in this regard, plaintiff respectfully refers 
this Honorable Court to the Supreme Court's decision in Katzenberger 
vs. Bryan 206 Va. 78 (1965) in which the court held that settlement 
of a contract claim. was no bar to a tort ·action against a separate 
party. In the instant case, plaintiff respectsfully submits that 
in the event that he did indeed release a tort feasor, which event 
he expressly denies, the release of a negligent to~t feasor should 
not operate as a release of another party sued for breach of 
contract or breach of warranty. 
Plaintiff therefore respectfully submits that the 1978 
settlement documents can, in no way, inure to the benefit of any 
of the defendant tort feasors herein, and as a result thereof, 
TPPI's plea and bar with regard to the agreement between the 
insurers and the plaintiff cannot be sustained. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In view of the foregoing, plaintiff respectfully submits 
that TPPI's pleas in bar with regard to jurisdiction and/or the 
release cannot be sustained and must therefore be dismissed. 
29 
Respectfully submitted,·· 
COLLINS & SINGLETON 
By __ ~~~--~----~--~------------John c. S1ngleton 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
P.O. Box 116 
Warm Springs, VA. 
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RESPONSIVE MEMORANDUM OF 
DEFENDANT T.P.P.I. 
ENGINEERING, INC. 
carriers desired to pay the amount of their policy limits on 
behalf of their insureds in return for a release of all claims 
·arising from Miss Cauthorn's bodily injury. 
The plaintiff argues that even if there has been a release of 
the negligent driver in this case, such a release should not 
foreclose breach of warranty claims made against another party. 
Presumably this argument is based on the premise that breach of 
warranty sounds in contract rather than tort. This premise is 
not supported by the law. With the demise of the privity 
requirement in breach of warranty cases {see Section 8.2-318 of 
the 1950 Virginia Code as amended), the warranty theory of recov-
ery in products liability cases has reassumed its original 
character as based in tort rather than contract. Underlying the 
doctrine of privity was the erroneous idea that warranty is, and 
always has been, a contractual concept. Actually, warranty was 
an action originally tortious in nature. Frumer and Friedman, 
Products Liability, § .~6.03[1]. In discussing the blurring of 
contract and tort in a products liability case involving Virginia 
law, the Fourth Circuit stated 11 that the standard of safety· 
-4- 31 
imposed on the manufacturer of a product is essentially the same 
whether the theory of liability is labelled warranty or negli-
gence or strict liability." Spangler v. Kranco, Inc., 481 F.2d 
373 (1973) at n.2, pg. 375, citing Chestnut v. Ford Motor 
Company, 445 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1971). {Chestnut, supra, was 
relied upon as authoritative in Logan v. Montgomery Ward, 216 Va. 
425, 219 s.E.2d 685 (1975)). 
In the case at bar, Miss Cauthorn's bodily injuries gave rise 
to one cause of action which could have been pursued through 
several theories of liability against several defendants. 
However, her entire cause of action was extinguished upon her 
release of the potentially negligent driver of the car in which 
she was injured. Any doubt concerning such a proposition is 
clearly resolved by Perdue v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 523 F. 
Supp. 203 (W.D. va. 1981), aff'd., 694 F.2d 66. (4th Cir. 1982), 
wherein the court held .that the prior release of the allegedly 
negligent driver of the car in which the plaintiff's son had 
died operated as a bar to any action against a tire manufacturer 
based in part on breach of warranty. 
Katzenberger v. Bryan, 206 Va. 78, 141 S.E.2d 271 (1965), 
cited in plaintiff's reply memorandum, is not authority for the 
proposition that a warranty claim should survive the release in 
' the instant case. The release in Katzenberger involved a 
contract claim. The court merely held that since a tortfeasor 
had not been released, the rule that the release of 6ne tort-
feasor is the release of all was not applicable. In the instant 
case the allegedly negligent driver was released. Therefore 
Katzenberger does not apply. 
32 
The plaintiff urges that even if the Court finds that a 
release exists it should be set aside on the basis of a mutual 
mistake of fact. This argument is somewhat surprising in that no 
evidence was presented by the plaintiff at the hearing of this 
matter as to what constituted his understanding of the facts. 
The only evidence before the Court indicates that the two 
insurance representatives involved in the prior settlement fully 
investigated the possibility of a defect in the automobile 
involved in the accident and could find no basis for such a 
claim. 
Given the plaintiff's failure to present any evidence as to 
his understanding of the facts, he should not now be heard to 
complain that a mutual mistake existed at the time of the origi-
nal settlement. Even if the ~laintiff and the guardian ad litem 
did not investigate the possibility of a defect in the automobile 
prior to acceptance of accord and satisfaction, such lack of 
knowledge could show, at best, a unilateral mistake of fact. See 
J & D Masonry, Inc., et al. v. Kornegay, 224 VRR 257 (1982) 
{cited in plaintiff's reply memorandum). 
The party seeking to set aside a release has the burden of 
proving by clear and convincing evidence that a mutual mistake of 
fact existed at the time of the release. Nationwide Mutual 
Insurance Company v. Muncy, 217 Va. 916 {1977) {cited in 
plaintiff's reply memorandum). This the plaintiff has failed to 
do. The plaintiff is unable to cite any authority for his 
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Plaintiff's Memorandum Contra Pleas in Bar 
Based Upon Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Payments by The 
Home Insurance Company and Hartford Insurance Company 
~nly was there no realization, indication, contemplation or inten-
tion in 1978 that the settlement with the Home and Hartford 
Insurance Companies would be dispositive of all claims which might 
otherwise arise out of Ms. Cauthorn's serious personal injuries, 
but there was no indication at any time prior to the execution of 
said documents that the plaintiff's accident and serious injuries 
were, in any way, caused or contributed to by any defect in the 
automobile. 
Finally, plaintiff respectfully submits that a release 
of one tortfeasor would not bar the plaintiff's claim for breach 
of warranty against the manufacturer who warranted that its pro-
ducts were of merchantable quality and fit for the purpose for 
which they were sold. While plaintiff could find no cases pre-
cisely on point in this regard, plaintiff respectfully refers this 
Honorable Court to the Supreme Court's decision in Katzenberger 
vs. Bryan 206 Va. 78 (1965) in which the court held that settlement 
of a contract claim was no bar to a tort action against a separate 
party. In the instant case, plaintiff respectsfully submits that 
in the event that. he did indeed release a tort feasor, which event 
he expressly denies, the release of a negligent tort feasor should 
not operate as a release of another party sued for breach of con-
tract or breach of warranty. 
34 
Plaintiff therefore respectfully submits that the 1978 
settlement documents can, in no way, inure to the benefit of any 
of the defendant tort feasors herein, and as a result thereof, 
TPPI's plea in bar with ~eqard to the aqreement between the in-
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BL CARS, LTD.'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF PLEA IN BAR BASED UPON RELEASE AND SATISFACTION 
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and 1982 has abrogated the common law rule. However, Section 
8.01-35.1(0) specifically states that it applies only to 
releases signed on or after July 1, 1980 regardless of the 
date the causes of action affected thereby accrued. The 
infant settlement in tne present case was approved by Order 
of the Court on April 27, 1978, and therefore, the common law 
rules of release apply. Perdue v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 523 
F. Supp. 203 (W.D. Va. 1981), aff'd., 694 F.2d 66 (4th Cir. 1982). 
Mr. Perry and the defendants in the present action are 
joint tortfeasors. In Dickenson v. Tabb, 208 Va. 184 (1967) 
the court recognized that, 
[W]here separate and independent acts of negligen~e 
of two parties are the direct cause of a single in-
jury to a third person and it is impossible to 
determine in what proportion each contributed to 
the injury, either or both are responsible for the 
whole injury. 
Id. at 192 (citations omitted). The court went on to note 
that if "negligence of two persons concur in proximately 
causing a single indivisible injury, then such persons are 
jointly and severally liable for the entire damage sustained 
" Id. at 193. Therefore, even though the negligences 
of Perry and the present defendants may not have occurred 
at the same time, the result of their negligences was a single 
indivisible injury and the parties are jointly and severally 
liable. 
The plaintiff c.lairns that the release of ,Perry for his 




in warranty against the present defendants. This position is 
not supported by the law of Virginia. Actions grounded in 
warranty versus negligence are not dissimilar. In Logan 
v. Montgomery Ward, 216 Va. 425 1 42'8 (1975) 1 the court recog-
nized that "the standard of safety of goods imposed on the 
seller or manufacturer of a product is essentially the same 
whether the theory of liability is labeled warranty or negli-
gence." In addition, the statute of limitations for actions 
arising under negligence and those under warranty are the 
same for personal injuries. Code of Virginia §§8.01-246, 8.01-
243. 
In Perdue v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 523 F. Supp. 203 (W.O. 
Va. 1981), aff'd., 694 F.2d 66 (4th Cir. 1982), the court held 
that the release of a negligent tortfeasor operated as a bar to 
a later suit against the tire seller on grounds of negligence 
and warranty. An accident occurred when Cherry attempted to 
negotiate a curve and lost control of the car and the plaintiff's 
decedent was killed. Cherry's car was equipped with a bias ply 
tire and three radial tires which were purchased from Sears. 
The plaintiff sued Cherry in a wrongful death action on grounds 
of negligence. Prior to·trial the parties entered a settlement 
agreement whereby Cherry paid the plaintiff $40,000.00 and in 
return the plaintiff released Cherry from any liability re-
lated to the accident. Shortly thereafter the plaintiff filed 
suit against Sears alleging failure to warn, failure to inspect, 
and breach of implied and express warranties o~merchantability. 
as181 
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The court granted Sears' motion for summary judgment 
on the grounds that the settlement and dismissal of the suit 
by the plaintiff against Cherry operated as a release of 
plaintiff's right of action against Cherry and all other 
joint tortfeasors. The court did not place significance on 
the fact that Cherry was alleged to have been guilty of 
negligence whereas Sears had allegedly breached a warranty. 
It is clear that the court considered Sears to be a joint 
tortfeasor. The common law rule releasing joint tortfeasors 
app.lies regardless of the theory of liability pursued by the 
plaintiff. See Wright v. Orlowski, 218 Va. 115 (1977); 
Shortt v. Hudson Supply & Equipment Co., 191 Va. 306 (1950). 
Even if the injuries which resulted from the automobile 
accident are somehow separable from the injuries sustained by 
the defects of the vehicle, the plaintiff's present action is 
barred since the plaintiff received accord and satisfaction 
in the infant settlement for the same injuries he now claims 
against the present defendants. The injuries alleged in para-
graph 10 of the Petition and the injuries claimed in paragraph 5 
of the Motion for Judgment are practically identical. Both 
allege that Rebecca suffered a fractured skull, a lacerated 
liver, a punctured lung, a broken pelvis and numerous other 
bodily injuries resulting in a permanent paralysis of the 
left side and permanent brain injury. The Court's Order re-
leased the insurance companies of all further"liability as 




faction through the payment and acceptance of $100,000.00. 
In the recent Virginia Supreme Court case of Dwyer v. 
Yurgartus, 224 Va. 176, 224 S.E.2d 792 (1982), the Court 
affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the action based on 
a Plea in Bar. The evidence produced at the hearing on the 
Plea showed that the plaintiff had released a defendant in 
one action for the same injuries he alleged·against another 
defendant in a different action. Consequently, the court 
found that the release of the first defendant released all 
other tortfeasors from liability for the same injuries. 
Id. at 794. 
Dwyer d~rectly controls the present action. The pla~n-
tiff claims the same injuries now as he did in the infant 
settlement. The infant settlement is a complete release of 
all tortfeasors for the same injuries, and, therefore, the 
present action is barred. 
III. THE INFANT SETTLEMENT WAS NOT ENTERED INTO BY THE 
PARTIES UNDER A MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT, AND EVEN IF 
IT WERE, THIS IS NOT A GROUND FOR SETTING THE SETTLE-
MENT ASIDE. 
In the plaintiff's Memorandum Contra to Pleas in Bar, 
he states for the first time that the infant settlement must 
be set aside because of a mutual mistake of fact. The plain-
tiff states, 
As of the date of execution of the settlement docu-
ments in 1978, neither the plaintiff herein, nor, 
to the best of plaintiff's knowledge, the insurance 
carriers or their counsel who were involved in the 
preparation of the settlement documents knew that 
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Action No. 569 
MEMORANDUM OF 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT 
OF PLEA OF RELEASE 
Rebecca Cauthorn nor her legal guardian were aware at the time 
of settlement of any possible defect in the automobile involved 
in the accident. Even if this were true, however, there could 
be no mutual mistake of fact because both insurance adjusters 
involved in the negotiations were aware, prior to settlement, 
that there might be a defect in the wheel of the Triumph auto-
mobile. [H. 37, 40-41, 50-51]. Both insurers in fact inves-
tigated the possibility of an actibn against'the manufacturer 
of the vehicle and rejected same because they saw no liability 
on that manufacturer. [H. 40-41, 51]. There was at best a 
unilateral mistake of fact on the part of the Cauthorns. 
Virginia law clearly requires a mutual mistake of fact before 
a solemn release can be avoided. Nation Wide Mutual ~· Muncy, 
217 Va. 916, 234 S.E.2d 70 (1977}; J ~ Q Masonry, Inc. v. 
Kornegay, 224 VRR 257 (Oct. 15, 1982). 
Plaintiff also argues that, even if Judge Stephen-
son's order constitutes a release of the driver-tortfeasor, 
a warranty claim against the manufacturer of the vehicle should 
survive such a release. Plaintiff cites in support of this 
position Katzenberger v. Bryan, 206 Va. 78, 141 S.E.2d 271 
{1965). Katzenberger does not, however, stand for the propo-
sition that a warranty claim survives the release of a tort-
feasor. Katzenberger involved a contract claim where no tort-
feasor was released, so that the rule that the release of one 
tortfeasor released all did not apply. In this case, Judge 





of this vehicle. 
I 
I 
Plaintiff's argument is further quashed by the 
recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit in Perdue~· Sears, Roebuck and Co., 523 
F. Supp. 203 (W.O. Va. 1981), aff'd, 694 F.2d 66 (4th Cir. 
1982). In Perdue, the Fourth Circuit held that the prior 
release of the driver of the vehicle in which plaintiff's 
son was a passenger operated to bar any action against the 
tire manufacturer based on breach of warranty. 
Finally, the infant settlement in this case was 
court-approved by order dated April 27, 1978. Pursuant to 
Rule 1:1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of V~rginia, 
judgment on. that .order was final twenty-one days.after.its 
entry. No appeal could lie to the Supreme Court after the 
expiration of thirty days after the order became .final. 
Rule 5:6 of· the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia. The 
plaintiff's attempt to attack the infant settlement thus 
comes too late by several years. 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear that the sole liability of The Home 
Insurance Company and The Hartford Insurance Company in the 
instant case arose from insurance coverage provided to the 
driver of the vehicle in which Ms. Cauthorn was injured, Mr. 
Perry. The release o·f the insurance companies for "any and 
all liability under their respective policies".clearly 
operated as a release of the insured, the driver of the 
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RE: Cauthorn v. British Leyland, et al 
By this letter opinion, the Court will dispose of some of the 
issues raised by the various pleas in bar filed in this matter:--
With regard to the plea in bar based upon lack of personal 
jurisdiction, the Court agrees with the alternative position of the Plaintiff 
that a ruling on this plea is premature until an opportunity is given by 
discOvery and evidence to establish whether or not the ''substantial revenue" 
test within the context of the Virginia Long Arm Statute is met. Code of 
Virginia, 1950, as amended, Section 9.01328.1, 4 and 5. 
The Court agrees with the position of Defendant:'t.P .. P.I. _ 
Engineerings, Inc. (Responsive Memorandum of Defendant T.P:P.I. Engineering, 
Inc., p. 4) that if the Court sustains the plea in bar based upon release 
and satisfaction that such a ruling would foreclose breach of warrenty claims 
also. Perdue v. Sears, Roebuck and Co •• 523 F. Supp. 203 (W.D. Va. 1981) aff'd., 
694 F. 2 66 {4th Cir. 1982). 
The Court has considered carefully the documents and agreements 
of counsel with regard to the issue of release. All seem to be in agreement 
that the scope of the release is determined by the intention of the parties 
as expressed in the terms of the particular instrument, considered.in the light 
of all the facts and circumstances. 66 Am. Jur. 2d, Release., § 30, Intention 
of the parties. · The Court is of the opinion that sufficient ambiguity exists 
within the documents themselves that the Court should consider "parol 
evidence" to clarify the .intent of the parties. Accordingly, the Court will 
consider the "parol evidence" already submitted by the defendants on March 16, 
1983 and other evidence which may be submitted at a subsequent hearing. The 
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Court is a little surprised that Defendant T.P.P.I. Engineering, Inc. 
(Responsive Memorandum of Defendant T.P.P.I. Engineering, Inc. p. 3) finds 
it remarkable that the Plaintiff would ask leave to present evidence on this 
point. The Court stated before the hearing on March 16, 1983, that by 
hearing "parol evidence" at that hearing of this issue it was not precluding 
additional evidence on the issue should the Court decide it was necessary and 
·proper to do so. · 
The Plaintiff has raised an issue of "mutual mistake of fact" 
(Plaintiff's Memorandum, P. 18-19). Also, as Defendant BL Cars, Ltd. points 
our (Defendant BL Cars Ltd. Memorandum),Code of Virginia, 1950, Section 8.01-
424 A provides that "any order or decree approving and confirming any 
such compromise shall be bjnding upon such party, except that same may be 
set aside for fraud. However, as Defendant University Motors, Ltd. points 
out (Defendant University Motors, Ltd. Memorandum, p.7) the evidence presented 
on March 16, 1983, makes it clear that "there was at best a unilateral mistake 
of fact on the part of the Cauthorns." 
It is significant to note at this time that Plaintiff's Memorandum 
was filed before the evidence on March 16, 1983, was presented. The issue of 
unilateral mistake and fraud are closely related in regard to the issue at bar 
J ~ D Masonry, Inc., et al. v. Kornegay, 224 V.R.R. 257 (1982) and Foreman v 
Clement, 139 Va. 70 (1924). Even though fraud has not been specifically pled 
the Court is of the opinion that it would be remiss not to consider additional 
evidence on this issue in light of the evidence currently before the Court. 




II. STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
1. Did the lower court err in sustaining the defendants' 
plea in bar based upon payments made by the two insurance carriers 
to the legal guardian of Eva Rebecca Cauthorn? 
2. Did the lower court err in taking testimony concern-
ing the execution qf the agreements between ~he legal guardian of 
Eva Rebecca Cauthorn and the two insurance carriers? 
These assignments of error were raised by way of the 
plaintiff Petitioner's opposition to the defendants' pleas in bar. 
46 
ORDER 
This cause came on this day to be heard on motions of 
defendants British Leyland UK. Ltd., now known as BL cars, Ltd., 
TPPI Engineering, Inc. and University Motors, Ltd. to sustain thefr 
Pleas in Bar to the plaintiff's Motion for Judgment filed herein, 
and the motion of the plaintiff for a rehearing of the defendants 
Pleas in Bar. The court, after hearing the arguments of counsel, 
GRANTS the plaintiff's Motion forreconsideration, and after heari~g 
I 
the evidence tendered by plaintiff, reaffirms ·its ruling sustainin~ 
the defendants Pleas in Bar to plaintiff's Motion for judgment, 1a 
ORDERS that the p_laintiff's action he;-ein is DISMISSED and hereby 
directs the Clerk of Court to mail to counsel for each of the 
parties in this action a certified copy of 
ENTER: 
We ask· for this: 
counsel for TPPI Engineering, Inc. 
Ltd. 
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seen and cense• • Gd to: 





Deputy C erk 
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Filed in the C~~k's Office of Bath Count,Y ~uit Court ~t}/j ~..] I 7 f 3 ~~~\ ,~:tfei 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
The Plaintiff, RICHARD MASON CAUTHORN, III, Legal 
Guardian of the Estate of Eva Rebecca Cauthorn, hereby gives 
notice of appeal from the orders of this Court entered on 
November 16, 1983 and further gives no~ice that the trial 
transcript covering the testimony and other incidents of trial 
will be filed, all in compliance with Rule 5:6 of the Rules of 
the Supreme Court of Virginia. 
Peter J. Judah 
Attorney at Law 
P. o. Box 774 
Hot Springs, Virginia 24445 
RICHARD MASON CAUTHORN, III, 
LEGAL GUARDIAN OF THE ESTATE 
OF EVA REBECCA CAUTHORN 
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CERTIFICATE 
I, Peter J. Judah, hereby certify that true copies of 
.,,( 
the foregoing Notice of Appeal were this / .... Y day of December, 
1983, mailed to H. Slayton Dabney, Jr., Esq., McGuire, Woods & 
Battle, 1400 Ross Building, Richmond, Virginia 23219, Counsel 
for British Leyland UK, Ltd., w. Fain Rutherford, Esq., Woods, 
Rogers, Muse, Walker & Thornton, P. o. Box 720, Roanoke, 
Virginia 24004, Counsel for T.P.P.I. Engineering, Inc., and 
William o. Tune, Jr., Esq., Gentry, Locke, Rakes & Moore, 

































(i.{y ~ f2:.-A-nlCi?zc:/ ~)"' Wednesday -~~ 19th .d'-a.y ~ September, 1984. · 
Richard Mason Cauthorn, III, 
Legal Guardian, etc., 
against Record No. 840223 
Circuit Court No. 569 
British Leyland, U.K., Lta., et al., 
From the Circuit Court of Bath County 
Appellant, 
Appellees. 
Upon. the petition of Richard Mason Cauthorn, III, legal 
guardian of the estate of Eva Rebecca Cauthorn, an appeal is awarded 
him from a judgment rendered by the Circuit Court of Bath County on 
the 16th day of November, 1983, in a certain motion for judgment 
then therein depending, wherein the said pe~itioner was plaintiff 
'I li 












being required. The appellees' motion to dismiss is denied. 
This appeal, however, is limited to consideration of 
the.question whether release of the claims for negligence bars 
recovery for the claims based upon breach of warranty. 
On further consideration w~ereof, it is ordered that the 
r~rts of the record to be printed or reproduced in the appendix are 
t(·· be limited tn those parts of the record germane to the question 
:::.;:;.::'-:
1a c~:~ faith, and the 1 riefs to be filed shall be limited to such 
~~ictis~io~ aci iri rele~ant to said question. 
~h~ p~~i~iefi fof appeal is refused to the extent it relates 




~uprrnie @nurt of ~irginia 
Richard Mason Cauthorn, III, LegalGuardian 
of the Estate of Eva Rebecca Cauthorn, 
against Record No. 84022~ 
Circuit Court No. 569 
British Leyland, u. K., Ltd., British Leyland 
Motors, Inc., TPPI Engineering, Inc., and 
University Motors, Ltd., 




Pursuant to Rule 5:30 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia, 
J., A !!en L. Lucy, Clerk of the said Court, do hereby certify that on 
Sep1:.c~tnber 19, 1984, an appeal 
was awarded 
from a judgment rendered by the court below on November 1·6, 19 83, 
the ~llit therein depending under the short style of Richard Mason 
tn 
~Hi1i~t..ti.t.,.,LU.-4,'>'~~~,L9.~£.dia!!.t_!!tc. v. nri tish Leyland, u. K., Ltd. I 
et al. 
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This certificate, constituting th~ summons on appeal, was this day 
mailed to the court below and to 
Peter J. Judah, P. o. Bo~ 774, Hot Springs,·Virginia 24445 
Christopher c. Fallon, Jr., The Atri~~, Third Floor, l900 Market 
Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103 
Counsel for Appellant 
William H. Robinson, Jr., 1400 Ross Building, Richmond, Virginia 23219 
H. Slayton Dabney, Jr., 1400 Ross Building, Richmond, Virginia 23219 
Adele Baker, 1400 Ross Building, Richmond, Virginia 23219 
William B. Poff, 105 Franklin Road, s. w., P. 0. Box 720, Roanoke, 
Virginia 24004 
W. Fain Rutherford, 105 Franklin Road, S. W.,P. 0. Box 720, Roanoke, 
Virginia 24004 
William 0. Tune, Jr., 800 Colonial Plaza, P·" o. Box 1018, Roanoke, 
Virginia 24005 
Linda A. Davis, 800 Colonial Plaza, P. o. Box 1018, Roanoke, Virginia 
24005 
Counsel for Appellees 
Lf ive:·l ur:der trly hand this 20th day of September , 19 84. 
53 
-2-
